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The Minerals Sector o f Angola
Background
Introduction
Portuguese navigators first landed on the shores o f present day Angolan territory in the second half o f 
the fifteenth century. Subsequently Luanda grew into a major trading post for goods from the interior, 
initially ivory, slaves and gold, and later, wild rubber, coffee and diamonds.
A t  the Berlin Conference o f 1885 Portugal formally lost control o f  the lucrative Zaire estuary to 
Belgium and their zone o f  influence on the south-west coast o f Africa was restricted to Angola and the 
Cabinda enclave, but it was not until the beginning o f the twentieth century that the subjugation o f the 
interior was completed and effective control over the colony was exerted.
Artisanal mining and smelting § f  ferrous and non-ferrous metals has been undertaken in AngolaTor the 
last two millennia, but it was not until the early part o f  this century that large scale mining commenced 
when the financial conglomerate, Societe Generale de Belgique, extended its operations from the then 
Belgian Congo (Za ire ) to the diamond fields o f  north-eastern Angola, via a sister company, Companhia 
de Diamantes de Angola (Diamang).
It is not known when Angolans first started using bitumen and viscous crude oil as a fuel, but certainly 
for several millennia. With the arrival o f the Portuguese their commercial exploitation was first 
considered and in 1767 49 barrels o f crude were shipped to Lisbon, but it was not until the 1950’s that 
large scale exploitation commenced1.
Recent History
In 1956 a nationalist movement, the Peoples Movement for the Liberation o f  Angola (M P L A 2), was 
formed in Luanda with a view to obtaining independence from Portugal. A  second movement, the 
F N L A 3, was formed from an older tribal organisation, the U PA , and from Angolan refugees in Zaire 
and in 1966 a third movement, U N IT A 4, was formed from a split in the F N L A . A ll three movements 
waged guerrilla warfare against the Portuguese colonial armies, with varying effectiveness^.
In 1963 the Portuguese opened up the Angolan economy to foreign investment in an attempt to gain 
support from the Western powers in their struggle against the nationalists. It was this policy that led to 
the massive expansion o f the Kassinga iron ore mines with the injection o f  international capital (Krupp 
o f the F R G  and Hojgaard &  Schultz o f  Denmark). Exports o f iron ore rapidly increased from 0.63 M t 
in 1966 to 6.3 M t in 1970 (900%). Crude petroleum production also increased dramatically with the 
participation o f  American and European oil companies (G u lf O il and Fina Petroleum), from 0.54 Mt 
in 1967 to 8.2 M t in 1973 (1420%). By 1973 minerals made up almost half o f  the total exports o f the 
country, double that o f a decade earlier. 1
In 1974 the new Portuguese government resolved to give independence to its colonies, but the three 
Angolan movements failed to come to an agreement and civil war broke out. The conflict was entered 
by South Africa with an invasion in the south, launched from its occupied territory, Namibia, and 
Zairean troops in the north, both o f  which were countered with the arrival o f  Cuban troops at the 
invitation o f  the M P LA . By April 1976 the M P L A  and their Cuban allies had thrown out the Zaireans, 
South Africans, F N L A  and U N IT A .
Both U N ITA an d  F N L A  resorted to guerrilla warfare against the M P L A  government in Luanda and the 
South Africans continued an undeclared war o f  destabilisation including regular invasions o f  the south
o f the country and widespread sabotage actions including an attempt on the Gulf O il installations in 
Cabinda. In the north Zaire continued to support the F N L A  until the Zairean guerrilla movement, the 
F N L C 6, operating from Angola and Zambia, in 1978 almost caused the collapse o f  the US backed 
Mobuto regime with an invasion o f the mineral rich Shaba (ex-Katanga) Province. The total disintegra­
tion o f Mobuto’s forces was only averted by the arrival o f French and Belgian paratroopers at Kolwezi. 
A fter this Mobuto quickly signed a “ friendship”  treaty with the Angolan government, but reports o f 
Zaire being used as a rear base by anti-government forces continue, even though Angola has disarmed 
and controlled the activities o f the FN LC  in its territory.
In the south both the South Africans and Americans backed U N IT A  with equipment, training, logistics 
and, when U N IT A  bases were threatened, South African forces were sent in to protect them. A fter the 
major South African military setback at Cuito Canavale in 1988, in 1989 the M P LA , Cuba and South 
Africa came to an agreement on the withdrawal o f  South African troops from Angola and Namibia and 
Cuban troops from Angola and for the independence o f  Namibia, which took place in April 1990. With 
the loss ofits rear base in Namibia, U N IT A  is reported to be now operating frombases in Zaire. Whether 
or not the Angolan Govemment will again counter by supporting Zairean dissidents is still unknown. 
The American government has pledged continued support for U N IT A
The Economy
In 1975 90% o f  the roughly360,000 Portuguese settlers fled the country, principally because o f  the war, 
depriving the new nation o f  almost all its skilled technical and managerial personnel. Due to 500 years 
o f  racist Portuguese education and employment policies there was only a handful o f  indigenous 
professionals on the eve o f  independence. Added to this was the enormous damage to the economy 
wrought by the invading South Africans in 1975 and early 1976, estimated at 6.7 GUSS at that time7.
The Angolan economy in 1973 was a typical Third W orld economy in the sense that it was vertically 
integrated into the economies o f the developed capitalist economies by supplying ever cheaper raw 
materials to them and importingrelatively more expensive finished goods from them. Local industiy was 
tiny with almost all output destined for the small settler population. Therefore in 1976 the new socialist 
government was not only faced with the usual Third W orld problem o f inheriting a satellite economy, 
but even this had been substantially destroyed by the second war o f liberation and almost all skills had 
left the country. Added to this they also had to deal with a continuing undeclared war o f destabilization 
by the R S A  and U S A  and their surrogates (U N IT A  F N L A  and Zaire). From 1976 to 1981 South 
African damage to the economy was put at almost 1 GUSS and substantial damage has been wrought 
by them since then.
rTable 1. A N G O L A  G O V E R N M E N T  E X P E N D IT U R E
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Expenditure (GKz1) 
Sector (%):
Econ. Development 
Social Services 
Defence
Administration 
other 
Total:
91*7  7 2 .0  67*6 8 2 .3
4 7 . 3  36 .6  2 6 . 5  2 6 . 6  
15 .1  2 0 . 8  2 1 . 9  2 1 . 0
16 .3  2 0 . 8  3 4 . 5  3 5 . 8
2 .9  19 .0  13-6  1 1 .5  
8 .4  2 .8  3 .5  5 .1
100 100 100 100
9 0 . 5  8 6 .2  8 7 .4  9 5 .5
2 6 . 0  1 5 .9  1 4 .9  17 .5  
2 0 . 8  2 4 . 9  2 6 . 8  2 1 . 0
3 8 . 0  3 7 . 9  4 1 .9  4 6 . 0  
10 .7  12*5  12 .4  11 .8
4 . 5  8 . 8  4 . 0  3 . 8
100 100 100 100
V
1Kz: Kwanza, national currency (officially 3 0 K z= lU S D ) 
Sources: Bhagavan 1986, INE, 1981/9. J
The immediate concern o f the new government was defence which accordingly received the largest part 
o f  the budget and a disproportionate share o f skilled cadres. Logically the second concern was to finance 
the war, hence resources were channelled into the oil industry (Sonangol), the largest foreign exchange 
earner. By 1987 the o il extraction and refining industry accounted for 98% o f exports as compared to 
30% in 1973 and it constituted 43% o f the GDP. As for the rest o f  the economy, large sections were 
nationalised in the wake o f settler abandonment while other sectors virtually collapsed.
From 1981 to 1988 the allocation for defence almost trebled from 16% to 46% o f the.state budget, an 
expense that the battered economy could ill afford. Most o f this increase was accounted for by a 73% 
drop in investment in “ economic development”  from 47% to 26% over the same period. W ith the 
decline o f  the manufacturing and agricultural sectors the Angolan economy has become increasingly 
dependent on the minerals sector, particularly the oil industry.
Bible 2 ANGOLA; BASIC ECONOMIC DATA (current GKz)
Year GNP Structure of GDP (%) Forex Foreign Trade External
Agri­
culture
Manufact Oil Prod 
& Mining & Refine
Rate
Kz/US$ Exports Imports
Debt
1980 1 08 .51 29 .92 5 6 .3 3 3 9 .72 18 .42
1981 1 1 7 .9 8 28 .48 55 .52 4 9 . 7 2 4 0 .8 6
1982 120 e 30 .21 4 8 , 7 4 2 6 . 5 2
1983 125 .34 11 .7 7 .6  2 6 .3 30 .21 5 4 .5 2 2 0 .5 1
1984 1 39 .64 9 . 6 8 .3  29 .6 3 0 .0 0 6 0 . 8 2 2 1 . 3 7 68 .37
1985 140.-9 8 8 .4 9 .2  32 .4 3 0 .00 6 6 .97 -19.69 7 4 .8 7
1986 175 .23 17.9 6 .5  37 .7 30 .00 3 9 .0 5 18 .59 100 e
1987 195 .48 13 .6 7 .5  4 3 .0 30 .00 6 4 .8 8 13 .37 152 e
e =  estimate Sources: M PA  1986, E IU  1986. IN E  1989.
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Due to the declining economic situation, in 1987 the Angolan government introduced a new economic 
regime, SEF (Saniamento Economico e Financeiro), that allowed for private ownership in virtually all 
sectors except for banking and defence and allowed for generous conditions for foreign investment. This 
has not resulted in a rush o f  private takeovers or an inflow o f  foreign capital, partly due to the continuing 
war and partly due to the fact that the government has failed to bring the official exchange rate in line 
with reality. Investors are unlikely to want to invest in the production o f products that then have to be 
sold at prices fixed in relation to the official Kwanza exchange rate (the parallel market rate is over thirty 
times the official one).
The Minerals Sector
Overview o f  the Minerals Sector
The minerals industry o f  Angola is, in terms ofvalue, the largest in the S AD CC , but this is almost entirely 
due to crude oil output In 1987 Angola constituted 12% o f the total SAD C C  population and 25% o f 
the area-, making it, after Botswana, the second least densely populated. Its G N P  was 29% o f  the total, 
resulting in a GNP/capita 137% higher than the overall SAD CC G D P o f 298 USD, while it had 19% o f 
the regional debt (58%  o f GDP).
In terms o f minerals, Angola accounted for 57% o f the total value o f  minerals produced in the region 
and the minerals industry contributed 45% o f the country’s GDP, equal to Botswana and more than 
double the SADCC average o f  19%. Mineral exports were 98% o f total national exports, 39% above the
4regional average o f  70% and the highest in the region. Due to its clear leadership in petroleum 
exploitation and refining Angola is the coordinating country for the SAD C C  Energy Sector which has 
its H Q  in Luanda.
Mineral export dependence has increased from 22% in 1963, to 47% in 1973 and to 98% in 1987, more 
than a fourfold increase in 24 years. A t the same time there has been an increasing dependence on one 
mineral, oil. In 1963 oil accounted for 13% o f mineral exports, in 1973 64% and by 1987 oil and oil 
products constituted 95%.
Table 3. A N G O L A : P R IN C IP A L  EXPO RTS,1963,1973 &  1987 (current G K z)
C o m m o d i t y 1963 % T o t a l  
V o l .  V a l . E x p o r t s
1973
V o l .  V a l .
% T o t a l  
E x p o r t s
1987 % T o t a l  
V o l .  V a l . E x p o r t s
D i a m o n d s  M o t s 1 . 2 9 0 . 7 7 1 6 . 2 2 . 1 1 2 . 0 0 1 0 . 4 0 . 8 5  1 . 6 3 2 . 5
I r o n  O r e  Mt 0 . 6 6 0 . 1 4 2 . 9 fj . 3 3 1 . 2 1 6 . 3 lllillM Ill
O i l ,  c r u d e  M b b l  0 . 3 2 0 . 1 3 2 . 7 7 . 3 2 5 . 7 6 3 0 . 1 1 1 6 . 0
L P G  k b b l illlllillHill liilillliliii 2 . 2 4
o i l  P r o d u c t s Mt 0..50
6 1 . 9 0 9 5 . 4
C e m e n t / c l i n k e r k t 3 6 . 6  0 . 0 4 lillili
T o t a l  M i n e r a l s ( % ) : 2 1 . 8 4 6 . 8 9 8 . 0
C o f f e e  k t 1 3 6 . 4 4 1 .8 9 4 0 . 0  2 1 3 . 4 1 5 . 0 8 2 6 . 5 1 6 . 1 3  1 . 0 0 1 . 5
S i s a l  k t 6 2 . 9 8 0 . 5 8 1 2 . 2 5 3 . 4 0 0 . 4 7 2 . 4
F i s h  k t 3 9 . 3 3 0 . 1 5 3 . 2  1 1 2 . 9 0 1 . 3 6 7 . 1 0 . 3 2 0 . 5
O t h e r 1 . 0 8 2 2 . 8 3 . 2 8 1 7 . 1 0 . 3  0 . 0 3 I ! § l ! l ! l
T o t a l  E x p o r t s ( G K z ) : 4 . 7 4 1 0 0 . 0 1 9 . 1 5 1 0 0 . 0 6 4 . 8 7 1 0 0 . 0
Sources: D ilolwa 1978, Minlsterio do Plano 1986, IN E 1989.
V ______________________________________________________ ___________________________________________ ________ /
Due to the security situation the variety o f minerals produced has shrunk dramatically, although the 
value has increased due to the relatively “bandit free”  nature o f  off-shore oil production; however, in 
May 1985 South Africa did attempt to sabotage the installations in the Cabinda enclave. Diamond 
production has continued, but since 1980 output has halved mainly due to bandit activity in the north­
east o f the country. The only othct significant mineral production is quarrying for construction 
materials such as limestone, gypsum and granite.
A t the 1977 and 1980 M P L A  Congresses fundamental mineral policy was formulated in which priority ■ 
was given to petroleum, diamonds, iron ore, phosphates, ornamental stones, underground water and 
copper exploitation.";., with a view to creating a balanced economy and conditions capable o f  generating 
the necessary surpluses for export” .8 This concentration on relatively few minerals (relative to Angola ’s 
resources) was due to the dearth o f skilled mining personnel available after the settler exodus o f 1975 
and the security situation.
The minerals industry comes under two separate ministries: The Ministry o f  Energy and Petroleum, 
which owns the state oil company, Sonangol, and the Ministry o f  Industry. The Mining Law o f 1979 
created, under the Ministry o f  Industry, the National Directorate for the Mining Industry with its 
research arm, the National Institute for Geology (Inageo, Geological Survey Dept.), and the National 
Department for Mines which controls several state mining companies (Endiama, Ferrangol, Roremina, 
Minaquartzo and Fosfang).
5( Table 4. A N G O L A ; M IN E R A L  PR O D U C TIO N  (Volum e)
U n i t 1973 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 7 3 - 8 3 8 3 - 8 8
D i a m o n d s M c t s 2 . 1 2 1 . 0 3 .9 1 .72 .2 7 .87 1 . 0 4 1 . 3 2 -5 1% 1%
F e , I r o n  O r e k t 6052 0 0 0 15 0 0 0 -1 0 0 % nap .
F e ,  s t e e l k t 3 5 . 7 3 . 0 4 . 4 4 . 1 7 . 0 1 . 0 2 . 0 - 9 2 % -3 2%
G r a n i t e m3 1432 0 466 336 0 139 1923 n a p l l i l l l l P I 90%
Gypsum k t 9 2 . 2 6 . 5 6 . 0 1 1 . 7 1 3 . 1 1 2 . 9 2 3 . 7 - 9 3 % 262%
K a o l i n k t .67 .0 0 . 0 0 ,0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 .0 0 -1 0 0 % n a p
L i m e s t o n e Mt . 9 0 . 1 5 .13 .26 .2 9 .29 .5 3 -8 4 % 262%
L i m s t ,  Cem ent  k t 125 145 131 282 210 322 298 n a p 157%
M a n g a n e s e k t 6 . 2 .0 .0 . 0 . 0 .0 . 0 . 0 -1 0 0 % n a p
M a r b l e m3 1475 218 95 120 232 120 258 272 -8 5 % 18%
O i l ,  C r u d e Mt 8 . 0 8 . 9 1 0 .2 1 1 . 6 1 4 . 1 1 8 . 0 2 4 , 6 2 4 . 4 11% 177%
O i l ,  LPG Mt . 0 0 2 . 7 1 3 . 1 6 3 . 5 1 4 . 2 7 4 . 4 0 n a p n a p
O i l ,  P r o d s . Mt . 7 0 1 . 2 2 1 . 2 0 1 . 3 9 1 . 4 0 1 . 5 0 1 . 3 9 73% 14%
P h o s p h a t e k t . 0 0 . 0 0 .2 3 .0 0 . 0 0 .0 0 . 0 0 .0 0 n a p n a p
Q u a r t z k t . 0 0 .02 .0 0 . 0 0 .0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 n a p n a p
s a l t k t 9 6 . 7 7 . 9 3 4 . 0 5 0 . 0 4 7 . 0 6 5 . 0 5 5 . 0 -9 2 % 596%
blank space =  no data, nap =  not applicable, Sources: IN E 1986/9, S AD C C  Energy TAU . 1989, 
v  D ilolwa 1978, Sonangol 1988._____________________________________________________________________
From 1973 to 1983 the production o f most minerals dropped significantly, due to the settler exodus and 
the war, except for crude o il production. However, since 1983 the production o f several minerals has 
improved, partly due to the better security situation in the south o f the country.
Legislation
Under the Angolan Constitution (Fundamental Law) all mineral resources “ ...are the property o f the 
State, which shall determine the conditions o f their exploitation...” 9. The Petroleum Law o f 1978 
governs all hydrocarbon exploration and production in Angola and under it Sonangol is the sole 
concessionaire with the right to explore for and produce petroleum, but can enter into association with 
foreign partners to achieve this.
The association is for an agreed duration, divided into exploration, development and production 
periods. The law also has provisions for matters relating to conservation o f resources and the 
environment, the utilisation o f natural gas, the training and utilization o f  Angolan personnel and the 
participation in management o f Sonangol in any association. Sonangol’s share in any association 
operating in less than 150 m o f water is set by the law at a minimum o f 51%. There are two basic forms 
o f association, namely, “production sharing agreements”  and “ joint ventures” .
Joint Ventures: Under this form Sonangol is the part owner o f the operation and its production share 
is proportional to its investment This type o f association was inherited from the colonial period and is 
the form for the Cabinda, Cabgoc, operation, in which Cabgoc is the technical operator for the venture. 
This is also the form for the onshore Congo and Kwanza operations.
Production Sharing Agreements: In this case the foreign operator acts as a contractor to Sonangol, is 
responsible for all o f the investment and risk and receives a share o f production in return. This form o f 
association was initiated after the division o f the continental shelf in 1978 into 13 Blocks. Under it there 
is also a “ price cap”  provision where there is a price cap for profit sharing, based on the U N  cost inflation 
index. A ll profit in excess o f  this price cap goes to Sonangol10. In this way the capture o f windfall and
monopoly rents is guaranteed.
A  revision o f  the Mining Law was enacted in 1987 (L e i 11/87) which brought it more in line with the 
Petroleum Law in that foreign participation (for production sharing) at the early stages o f  exploration 
and feasibility studies will be encouraged for projects that will be mainly export oriented. This is being 
done because, at the present time, the state does not have the capacity for an expansion in exploration 
activity. The types and responsibilities o f  the associations are as defined by The Law on Foreign 
Investments in which the repatriation o f after tax profits is allowed up to a limit o f 25% o f invested 
capital.
The Petroleum Industry 
O il Production
Oil exploration by the “ Canha &  Formigal”  company started in 1910 in the Congo and Kwanza basins 
and in 1915 the first well was sunk in the Kwanza basin. The basins are typical o f the passive margin type, 
associated to continental drift. Most o f the reserves (Cabinda) are o f lower Cretaceous (A lb ian) and 
Upper Jurassic age. A  significant salt layer divides the sequence from rift type to continental margin type 
and serves as the important cap rock for the petroliferous' sediments below. The crude is basically a good 
quality light (about 36 degrees A P I, 0.8 SG ) but can be extremely variable.
Production started in 1955 and in 1958 was 58 M t from the Kwanza field. Production subsequently 
started up in the Cabinda and Congo basins. From 1968to 1969 production jumped 224% from0.75Mt 
to 2.4 M t and replaced coffee as the country’s premier export. By 1973 production had increased 236% 
(relative to 1969) to 8,175 Mt, 90% from the Cabinda basin (off-shore), 7%  from the Kwanza basin (on­
shore) and 3%  from the Congo basin (on-shore)11.
Table 5. IN D E X E D  V A L U E  O F  C R U D E  O IL  E X P O R TS  (1975=100)
US GNP 1975= Price Indexed Exports Indexed
Year deflator 100 (US$) (US$) (Mbbl) Value
1970 9 1 . 4 5 1 3 7 .2 3 1 . 3 0 1 . 3 0 3 1 . 2 9 9 . 6 2
1971 9 6 . 0 0 1 3 0 .7 3 1 . 7 0 1 . 6 2 3 4 . 8 0 1 3 . 3 3
1972 9 9 . 9 8 1 2 5 .5 3 l.^O 1 . 7 4 5 0 . 0 6 2 0 . 5 7
1973 1 0 5 . 6 8 1 1 8 .7 5 2 . 7 0 2 . 3 4 5 3 . 6 8 2 9 . 6 6
197 4 1 1 4 . 9 5 1 0 9 . 1 8 1 1 . 2 0 8 . 9 1 5 4 . 2 4 1 1 4 . 2 9
1975 1 2 5 . 5 0 1 0 0 . 0 0 1 0 . 9 0 7 . 9 4 5 3 . 2 4 1 0 0 . 0 0
1976 1 3 2 . 1 0 9 5 . 0 0 1 1 . 7 0 8 . 1 0 3 1 . 1 5 5 9 . 6 7
1977 1 4 0 . 0 3 8 9 .6 2 1 2 . 8 0 8 . 3 6 5 5 . 5 0 1 0 9 . 7 1
i 9 7 8 1 5 0 . 3 5 3 3 .4 7 1 2 . 9 0 7 . 8 5 3 7 . 1 0 6 8 . 8 4
1979 1 6 3 . 4 0 7 6 . 8 1 1 8 . 6 0 1 0 . 4 1 4 2 . 9 0 1 0 5 . 6 1
1980 1 7 8 . 4 3 7 0 . 3 4 3 0 . 5 0 1 5 . 6 3 4 0 . 9 0 1 5 1 . 1 9
1981 1 9 5 . 6 0 6 4 . 1 6 3 5 . 6 0 1 6 . 6 4 3 8 . 1 4 1 5 0 . 1 2
1982 2 0 7 . 4 0 6 0 . 5 1 3 1 . 4 0 1 3 . 8 5 3 9 . 2 6 1 2 8 . 5 4
1983 2 1 5 . 3 0 5 8 . 2 9 2 7 . 8 0 1 1 . 8 1 5 4 . 8 5 1 5 3 . 1 6
1984 2 2 2 . 9 0 5 6 . 3 0 2 7 . 2 0 1 1 . 1 6 6 4 . 1 6 1 6 9 . 3 2
1985 2 3 0 . 0 0 5 4 . 5 7 2 5 . 9 0 1 0 . 3 0 7 2 . 8 2 1 7 7 . 3 4
1986 2 3 7 . 0 0 5 2 . 9 5 1 2 . 2 9 4 . 7 4 9 2 . 3 0 1 0 3 . 5 1
1987 2 4 6 .0 0 5 1 . 0 2 1 5 . 4 5 5 . 7 4 1 1 6 . 0 0 1 5 7 . 5 5
1988 2 5 5 . 0 0 4 9 . 2 2 1 3 . 3 5 4 . 7 9 1 5 5 . 6 0 1 7 6 . 1 7
Douglas 1983, Council o f  Economic Advisors 1990.
Production from the latter two basins peaked in 1974 at 172 kbbl/day and has since been on the decline 
as the reserves are depleted, while both the reserves and production from the off-shore fields (Blocks 
0,2, and 3) has been on the increase. By 1986 both production and reserves were double that o f  a decade
earlier and reserves are presently estimated to be good for twelve years at present production rates. 
From 1975 to 1985 the rate o f  reserves discovery was twice the extraction rate.
Production in 1988 was 24.6 M t (452 kbbl/day), almost four times the 1980 figure and is still on the 
increase. Production costs are estimated to be about 5 USD/bbl, well below even the lowest world 
market price over the last ten years. In 1988 exports o f  o il and oil products were worth 61.9 GKw, 95.4% 
o f total-exports, a 40% increase on 1980 (44.1 M Kz). The 1988 volume o f  o il exports was three times 
greater than 1975, but the real value o f  exports was only 76% greater due a fall in the real unit value o f 
40%, but the o il price picked up steadily in 198912.
Pre-independence, the main companies were: in Cabinda^ Cabgoc (Cabinda G u lf O il Company) owned 
by G u lf O il o f  the U SA; in Kwanza, Petrangol, 30% owned by the colonial state, but controlled by 
Petrofina o f  Belgium; and, in the Congo Basin, there were a variety o f  companies including Petrangol, 
Angol (Portuguese), Texaco (U S A ) and Total (French). In 1972 Cabgoc gave up its Cabinda onshore 
concession and in 1976, due to the U SA ’s support for the Zairean/FNLA/mercenary and the RSA/ 
UMTA/mercenary invasions o f  Angola and its refusal to recognise the M P L A  government, production 
stopped for six months causing output to fall from 48.8 Mbbl (1975) to 28.6 Mbbl (1976). A fter the 
passing o f  the Petroleum Law in 1978, Sonangol acquired a 51% share o f  the association.
The state oil company, Sonangol (Sociedade Nacional de Combustiveis de Angola), was formed in 1976 
and under the Petroleum Law o f 1978 (law 13/78) Sonangol became the exclusive concessionaire for 
hydrocarbon exploration and production. It acquired the operations o f Angol (Portuguese) and entered 
into a series o f joint ventures and production sharing agreements with the o il transnationals. During 
1977-78 Sonangol became a 51% participant in an off-shore Cabinda joint venture with Cabgoc (G u lf 
Oil, now owned by Chevron) in which production is shared at a 51:49 ratio. Sonangol also has joint 
venture operations in the Congo and Kwanza basins with Texaco (U S A ) and Petrofina (Belgium). By 
1984 Sonangol “ owned”  approximately half o f Angola’s oil production through equity participation and 
production sharing.
E lf Aquitaine o f  France was a late-comer to the Angolan oil industry when a production sharing contract 
was signed in 1980 for offshore Block 3 west o f Block 1, o ff the northern Angolan coast. The association 
was made up o f  E lf 50% (operator), Mobil 25%, Agip  15%, Ina Naftaplan 5%  and Naftagas 5%. In 1984 
Mitsubishi (A jo co ) bought M obil’s share13. From 1981 to 1988 over 300 km o f  wells were drilled and 
in the first year the Palanca field was discovered, followed by a series o f further discoveries in 1982,1985 
and 1987. Production started in 1985 (8 Mbbl) and was 150 kbbl/day (about 7.4 Mt/an) in 1989.
In 1987 the Cabinda association became: Sonangol 51%, Cabgoc 39.2% and A g ip  (Italy) 9.8%. This was 
in part due to the fact that the U SA  continues to support the destabilisation o f  Angola and still refuses 
to recognise the Luanda government;, provoking fears that Washington might force G u lf to withdraw.. 
The inclusion o f  an alternative, non American, oil company (Agip , Italian state company) that could 
take over as operator was seen as a precaution in this regard. Until recently there were Cuban troops 
helping protect American oil companies from American supplied U N IT A  insurgents and South 
African sabotage squads.
In 1988 the company breakdown o f Angolan oil production was: 
(  Table 6 A N G O L A : 1988 O IL  PR O D U C T IO N
O p e r a t o r A r e a k b b l / d a y %
C a b g o c C a r b i n d a  o f f s h o r e 2 6 7 . 8 60%
E l f O f f s h o r e  b l o c k  3 1 1 0 . 6 25%
F i n a O n s h o r e 3 5 . 6 8%
T e x a c o O f f s h o r e  b l o c k  2 3 2 . 6 7%
T o t a l 4 4 6 . 6 100%
Source IE U  1989.
In 1978 the Angolan continental platform was divided into 14 exploration blocks (to  a depth o f roughly 
200m) and Sonangol formulated production sharing and/or joint venture agreements for eight o f these 
concessions with several o il companies. Sonangol also has joint ventures for companies which service 
the petroleum industry, an example o f which is Petromar which builds off-shore o il installations, 
submarine pipelines and port facilities, at the port o f  Am briz (north o f  Luanda).
O il Refining
In 1958 a small refinery (2 kbbl/day) was opened in Luanda by Petrangol and in 1972/3 it was 
substantially expanded to refine 30 kbbl/day (1.5 Mt/an). It is a hydro-skimming refinery primarily for 
the production o f gasoline, jet fuel and gas oil for the domestic market. A t  present the product mix o f 
the refinery is not compatible with Angolan consumption and some petroleum products still have to be 
imported (142 kt in 1987,78% jet fuel). The refinery was expanded in 1987 by a Portuguese contractor 
to handle 1.6 to 1.75 Mt/an, depending on the crude used. The current crude is from offshore (Block 3, 
E lf) which is much lighter (38.3 A P I) than the previous feed from onshore Soyo. In 1988 the refinery 
produced 1.4 M t o f  oil products, ofwhich 0.57 M t were exported14. In 1986 there was a major investment 
o f  9 M U SD  to create an autonomous electricity generating capacity for the plant, in case o f a power 
cutoff due to sabotage o f the electricity supply, which can also supply parts o f  Luanda in case o f 
emergency.
N atural Gas
In 1982 two feasibility studies for the establishment o f  an ammonia plant based on natural gas were 
undertaken by Arthur D. L ittle (U K ) and the International Gas Development Corporation (U S A ) and 
in 1984 a regional (SAD C C ) fertilizer market survey was undertaken by Cramer and Warner (U K ) 
funded by the Commonwealth Secretariat (CFTC ). These studies resulted in a proposal for the 
construction o f a plant to produce 1100 t/d o f  ammonia and 1800 t/d o f urea, at a cost o f  roughly 500 
MUSS. It is planned to locate the plant near Soyo in the extreme north-west o f  the country, close to 
Blocks 1,2 and 3, the source o f  the gas. The gas reserves are considered good for the life o f  the plant (20 
years).
Soyo is only 80 km north o f  the Kindonocaxa phosphate deposit and the possibility o f  establishing an 
integrated phosphate/urea fertilizer plant is under consideration. The production o f  P V C  from propane 
in the gas o f  Blocks 3 and 4 is also being investigated as part o f  the ammonia project. A t  present, finance 
for the project is being sought from south-east Asian companies, specifically South Korea (consortium 
led by Daiwo Corp.), in which the backers would take the majority o f  production as the regional 
(S AD C C ) market represents only 10% o f projected output
Natural gas is also used for both gas lift and injection to boost crude oil production and for the 
production o f  L P G 15 for export at the rate o f 4 to 5 Mt/annum.
Asphalt
Angola also has reserves o f  asphaltic rocks in the Cabinda basin, the Congo basin (Gondo and Musserra) 
and the Kwanza basin (exploited in the past). In Angola the name “ libolite”  has been given to natural 
bitumen (tar) as a large deposit occurs at L ibolo near Kwanza. Deposits o f “ libolite”  are also found at 
Kilundo, Kirimbo and Porto Amboim. Between 1948 and 1973 roughly 810 kt (30 kt/an.) o f  asphaltic 
rock were produced with a bituminous content o f  18 to 22%, principally for road surfacing16. 
Exploitation o f  this resource has ceased as the output o f bitumen from the refinery covers local needs 
at present. The deposits were considered for refining into petroleum products in the mid-eighties but 
the cost was well above market prices for the products. In general, the tarred roads o f the region are in 
an awful state o f  repair, often for the lack o f  forex to import bitumen, yet Angola has huge natural 
resources that could be exploited at almost no cost other than the cost o f  transport.
The M ining Industry 
Diamonds
The first systematic prospecting for and exploitation o f diamonds in Angola was by Companhia de 
Pesquisas Mineiras (Pem a) in the northeast o f the country (Lunda) in 1913. In 1920 this was taken over 
by Companhia de Diamantes de Angola (Diamang) which was owned by Societe General de Belgique 
(SG B ) 18%, Portuguese financial concerns 16.4%, the Diamond Corporation (D e  Beers) 1.7% and the 
public (mainly Portuguese), 49%.
In 1922, Ernest Oppenheimer o f Anglo American (South A frica) managed to secure the selling rights 
for all o f  Diamang’s production as part o f his international bid to control the diamond market and 
thereby get control o f D e Beers, the largest producer. In 1929 Anglo American took over D e Beers and 
Oppenheimer became Chairman and in 1934 the Diamond Producers Association was formed, 
dominated by De Beers, which to this day has a virtual monopoly over diamond marketing via the 
Diamond Trading Company and its Central Selling Organisation (CSO).
Until 1964 all o f Angola’s official sales were to the CSO in the U K , but from that year a proportion o f 
the most valuable diamonds went directly to the Sociedade Portuguesa de Lapidacao (D ialap), paid for 
in Portuguese escudos rather than U K  pounds.
Diamang had exclusive exploitation rights over 81% o f the country and maintained a “ state within a 
state” 17 particularly in Lunda district where it ran its own police force, administered justice, maintained 
a standing army o f  mercenaries and was responsible for agriculture, health, education, etc. Contrary to 
the migrant mining labour supply systems common in the rest o f  southern Africa, Diamang encouraged 
the formation o f  a permanent labour force which stood at 25 thousand in 1973.
In 1971 Diamang ceded most o f its diamond exploration and mining rights. (except for the Lunda and 
Kassanje areas) to Concorcio Mineiro de Angola (Condiama), a local prospecting arm o f D e Beers, 45 %  
owned by D e Beers, 45% by Diamang and 10% by the Angolan colonial state.
From 1950 to l957 exports ran at between 700 and 800 kcts/annum, representing from 7 to 13% o f total 
exports by value. From 1958 exports steadily increased to a peak o f  2,503 kcts in 1970 (19%  o f total 
exports) before falling to 0.27 Mcarats in 1987, due to the security situation in the north-east where the
diamond operations suffered several U N IT A  attacks in the 1980s. Production has since improved to 
1.31 Mcarats in 1989. It should be borne in mind, however, that these figures are for “ official”  exports. 
A  significant proportion o f  production has always been smuggled (up to 50% )18.
^  Table 7. A N G O L A : D IA M O N D  P R O D U C T IO N  (M cts) 
A N D  P E R C E N TA G E  O F  E X PO R TS
1970 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
P r o d 2 . 5 e 1 . 4 9 1 . 4 0 1 . 2 2 1 . 0 1 0 . 9 2 0 . 7 2 0 . 2 7 0 . 8 7 1 . 0 4 1 . 3 1
%Exp 1 9 . 7 lllllll 1 1 . 9 1 1 . 5 5 . 6 4 . 7 3 . 3 0 . 8 2 . 5 n a n a
na: not avalable, Sources: Dilolwa 1978, IN E  1989,
In 1973 60% o f Diamang’s output was gem grade and 40% industrial grade, a gem-to-industrial ratio 
that was only bettered by Namibia (C D M ). In that year there were 45 open pit alluvial diamond workings 
in Angola. A t present the gradeo f production is running at greater than 90% gem quality.
The state diamond company, Empresa Nacional de Diamantes de Angola (Endiama), was created after 
the passing o f the Mining Law o f 1979 and is responsible for diamond prospecting, mining, processing 
and marketing. The main mining areas are Lucapa, Cassanguidi, Andrada, Maludi, Cuanga and 
Calondo, in the centre-north and north-western part o f the country. A ll the mines are open pit alluvial 
workings using heavy medium separation.
Until theend o f1985, an indirect subsidiary o f De Beers, Mining and Technical Services (M A T S ) o f the 
U K , was providing administrative, technical and marketing services to Endiama’s mining subsidiary, 
Diamang, but the contract was not renewed. Since then Diamang was dissolved, in 1986, and Endiama 
has created three mining operations:
1) A  joint venture with R ST19 International (Cuango area)
2) A  joint venture with SPE20 o f Portugal (Lucapa area)
3) Endiama on its own (Andrade and Lucapa area)
This system appears to have worked well in that production increased to 1,316 kcarats in 1989, but it is 
reported that Filipino workers have been imported to do much o f  the work. R S T  International comes 
from the Amax holding in Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (Z C C M ) which was bought out by a 
Greek entrepreneur, Sardanis, who was one o f  the directors nominated by the Zambian government on 
the board o f Nchanga Copper Mines (R S T ) in the early seventies, after nationalisation. SPE, in which 
Sibeka has a holding, apparently has access to the Portuguese staff previously employed by Diamang.
Until 1986 official output was marketed through the CSO but since then Endiama has managed to 
secure higher prices21 through a contracts with U K  (Industrial Diamond Corporation), Belgian 
(Steinmetz-Evans) and US (Lazare Kaplan) companies. This arrangement was put together with advice 
from Martyn Marriott o f o f D C I22 who advised the Botswana government on its early, relatively 
favourable deal, with D e Beers in theseventies. However it has been reported23 that talks have been held 
with D e Beers on the possibility o f Endiama re-entering the CSO fold, but only i f  D e Beers agrees to 
develop Angola’s huge diamond kimberlite pipe potential. The main advantage o f  in situ pipe mining 
is that it is concentrated in one locality and therefore easier to defend than the scattered alluvial 
workings. The main disadvantage is the large initial capital outlay (about 500 MUSS). There are 638 
reported kimberlite pipes, 300 o f  which are thought to have economic grades, some o f which are among
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the ten largest in the world. The possibility o f using Soviet expertise to develop these pipes is also being 
pursued.
Angola’s alluvial diamond mining potential is considered to be several orders greater than present 
output, worth well over 0.5 GUS$/annum if  developed. Reserves have been calculated at 90 Mcts but 
the potential is estimated at 350 Mcts (U N TC D , 1980). The main limitation to the expansion o f this 
sector is the security situation in the north-east o f the country.
Iron and Steel
The iron ore mining firm, Companhia Mineira de Lobito, started up in 1929 with Portuguese capital 
(Sousa Machado family), but only obtained its first major mining concessions in 1949. A  second mining 
company, Sociedade Mineira de Lombije, owned by the same family, acquired a mining concession for 
Kassinga iron ore deposits in 1953 and was later integrated into the Companhia Mineira de Lobito 
(1968). The major capital injection came from Krupp (F R G ), Jogaard &  Schultz (Denmark) and a 
Portuguese company o f 1.3 G K z to the Lombije company for the opening up o f  the Kassinga mines, for 
putting is  the railway to the port o f  Namibe and for the construction o f  the-bre terminal. In 1965 Krupp 
loaned the Lobito company 1.5 G K z for the purchase o f  locomotives and rolling stock to move the ore24.
From 1969 to 1973 exports oscillated between 5 and 6.4 Mt. In 1973 6,330 kt were exported and 6,052 
kt were mined. In that year 94% o f production came from the opencast Kassinga mines o f  Jamba and 
Tchamutete with the rest coming from Mulanje district (Mounts Saia and Tumbi). The mines at Kwima 
(Huambo district) had been inactive for some time. The known high grade secondary haematite ores at 
Kassinga were virtually exhausted by 1973 and exploitation o f the huge primary itabirite reserves was 
planned. These were to be pelletized at the rate o f 6 Mt/annum o f pellets. The Kassinga reserves occur 
in pre-Cambrian banded ironstones as secondary (high grade) haematite ores, residual and elluvial 
“ pebble ores”  and primary (low  grade) itabiritic ores25.
W ith the South African invasion from the south in 1975 and their subsequent regular incursions into 
southern Angola, mining at Kassinga came to a standstill. In 1981 the state iron and manganese mining 
company, Empresa Nacional de Ferro (Ferrangol) was formed. Since its creation it has mainly been 
involved in the rehabilitation o f the Kassinga operations, aided by Austromineral (Voest-Alpine, 
Austria) who have had a technical consultancy contract with Ferrangol. The reserves at Kassinga o f 
detrital ore (40-45% Fe) have been reassessed at 100 M t (cut o ff grade o f 40%), while the reserves o f 
lower grade (30-35% Fe) primary ores stand at greater than 1 Gt.
M in ingof the detrital limonite-haematite-martiteore at the rate o f  1.1 Mt/year o f  concentrate (72-74% 
Fe) has been planned for some time.
“However, mining is unlikely to start up again in the foreseeable future for two 
reasons: the railway to Namibe needs extensive rehabilitation and world market 
prospects are much worse than had been forecast...” 26
Angola has numerous other iron ore deposits (see map) the most important o f which is the huge 
Kassala-Kitungo resource, in the Kwanza-Norte Province 150 km ESE o f Luanda. Pre-independence 
this deposit was evaluated by the Companhia de Manganes de Angola, but was never exploited. The 
Kassala and Kitungo deposits are situated 7 km apart and contain an estimated 300 M t o f primary ore 
grading30 to 35% Fe, mainly in the form o f titano-magnetite in a country rock o f norite. A  project for 
the production o f  2.5 Mttyear o f  pellets using a slurry pipeline to Luanda has been put on ice by 
Ferrangol, due to the high initial investment cost o f roughly 500 MUSS.
The state enterprise Siderurgia Nacional in Luanda is the only producer o f  steel in the country. It used
to belong to the Champalimand (Portugal) group o f  companies and initially rolled rails from imported 
ingots. In 1972 a small 18 ton arc furnace was installed for the production o f ingots. A t present it is 
smelting local scrap only as pellets are still not locally available. Production o f ingots in 1974 was 28.8 
kt o f ingots from which 26.6 kt o f  rod were rolled (capacity 50 kt/an). By 1988 production had fallen to 
2 kt o f  steel. A  separate state company, F A T A , imports steel sheet for the production o f tube and angles.
The possibility o f  establishing a 1.0 Mt/an D R I27 plant using natural gas to produce sponge iron as a feed 
for a 150 kt/an steel plant (E A F 28, expansion o f  Siderurgia National) is under consideration by 
government29. Angola imports about 40 kt/an o f  steel as raw or semi-manufactured items and a U N ID O  
study done in 1986 projected that the crude steel equivalent o f  steel-based imports would be 93 kt/an 
in 1995 (base case)30.
Manganese
Manganese ore was produced at the Kiaponte and Kitota mines in Malanje Province until 1973 by the 
Companhia do Manganese de Angola. Over thirtyyears from 1943 to 1973 604 kt o f  ore were extracted31. 
The main occurrences are the Maiombe region (Cabinda), the Lucala region (Kiapdnte and Kitota 
mines, Cuanza Norte and Malanje), Quicama (Bengo) and Capuia (Huambo). There are also many 
other occurrences. Reserves in the most important region (Lucala) are estimated at 5 M t o f  high grade 
ore (55-56% Mn), bu t large areas have not been assessed32. Ferrangol is also responsible for manganese 
exploitation, but has no plans for the reactivation o f the mines.
Phosphates
Angola has significant reserves o f phosphates in the Cretaceous-Quaternary sediments north ofLuanda 
and in Cabinda. A  state company, Empresa Mineira de Fosfatos do Zaire (Fosfang), has been created 
to handle the exploitation o f phosphates. The main resource is near the coast at Kindonacaxa, about 40 
km north o f the small port o f N ’zeto. The phosphates in this zone are o f  marine origin in the form o f 
cropolites and reserves have only been determined for a small area o f 18 km2 where there are 7 M t o f 
phosphate rock grading 29.4% P2O s. Reserves for the whole zone are estimated to be greater than 200 
M t  In 1982 an experimental pilot processing plant was set up at Kindonacaxa to concentrate the 
phosphate rock by Fosfang in collaboration with Bulgargeomin (Bulgaria). The plant operated at a rate 
o f  15 kt/annum for 1983 and 1984, then shut down due to problems in the distribution o f  the product 
to the agricultural users in the centre and south o f the country. The project will recommence as soon 
as conditions allow.
The other major reserves are located in Cabinda Province and are different to those o f Kindonacaxa. 
Energoprojekt o f Yugoslavia has been assessing these deposits and prognostic reserves are estimated 
at roughly 200Mt. One o f the deposits, at Mongo-Tando, has 40 M t o f  reserves grading 31.4% P20 5. The 
polymetallic deposits o f  Tetelo-Bembe-Uige have been considered for the production o f sulphuric acid 
as a by-product from the processing o f sulphide minerals for the manufacture o f  super-phosphates, as 
has the sulphur in natural gas.
Marble
Angola has several deposits o f  high quality marble, but only two quarries are in operation, due both to 
the shortage o f  skilled personnel and to the security situation. In 19731,457 m3 were quarried but the 
present output is only 20% o f this at roughly 270 m3 per year for the domestic market.
The quarries are run by the state company, Roremina (Empresa Nacional de Rochas Omamentais),
which has its H Q  in the south o f  the country at Lubango, in the region o f  the deposits. The quarrying 
o f  marble will be expanded as soon as conditions perm it
“Granite”
Roremina is also responsible for the exploitation o f  ornamental “ granite”  and it operates several 
quarries in the south o f  the country in the region o f  Chicuatite near Lubango. The black granite is a dark 
anorthosite and the Angolan product is internationally recognised. In 1973 output was just under 8,000 
m3. Production in 1989was 599 m3 o f “ black granite” , 526 m3 o f “ grey granite” , 798 m3 o f “ red granite”  
(total 1923). A ll production is exported to Europe via the port o f  Namibe. In 1980 it was estimated that 
with improvements in stone cutting techniques and marketing, production could be increased to up to 
20,000 m3/annum worth roughly 12 MUSS, as the Angolan product has a ready market33.
Quartz
The state crystalline quartz quarrying company, Empresa Mineira de Quartzo (Minaquartzo), is located 
in the south o f  the country in Kwanza Sul Province. The high purity fusing quartz occurs in the Condo 
region where the Pocaria I  orebody is mined and has reserves estimated at 0.9 M t in three veinlike 
6'febodies, but there are also several other unassessed veins34. ''Due to its high quality the quartz 
competes favourably on the world market, but there has been no production since 1985 due to the 
■ security situation.
Cement
There are two cement plants in the country, in Luanda and Lobito. Cement production was 311.7 kt in 
1968 and peaked at 767.6 kt in 1973. By 1988 production had decreased to 322 kt. The producing 
companies used to be Secil (Luanda) and Companhia de Cimentos de Angola (Lob ito ), but the latter 
company is not producing at the moment, while the former is now a mixed state enterprise called 
Cimangola (Empresa de Cimentos de Angola) in which the state has a majority shareholding and 31% 
is held by a group made up o f F.L. Smidth &  Co. and Hojgaard &  Shultz o f  Denmark who have a 
management and service contract The Lobito company is now completely state owned and is called 
Encime (Empresa Nacional de Cimento).
Copper
The copper deposits in U ige Province in the north used to be mined by Empresa do Cobre de Angola 
which was linked to a Portuguese monopoly (CUF, later became Simeira). The three main deposits are 
at Mavoio, Tetelo (1 km apart and about 120 km north o f  U ige) and Bembe. These are metasoma tic type 
deposits occurring in the West Congo formation, and the copper is found in limestones and calcareous 
shales or sandstones o f  the “ Schisto-Calcaire”  Series, generally associated to the Luango Fault Zone.
It is estimated that the Mavoio and Bembe mines produced some 170 kt o f  copper between 1939 and 
1963 when mining ceased.
Geological (inferred) ore reserves o f the Tetelo-Bembe “ zone”  are estimated at 10 M t at 2% Cu. 
Although copper is the main metal there arealso associated elements such as vanadium, cobalt, barium, 
lead, zinc, gold and silver35. The National Directorate for the M ining Industry is at present interested 
in setting up a joint venture for the exploitation o f the polymetallic sulphide deposits o f  U ige Province, 
dependent on an improvement o f  the security situation.
The major other copper “ zone”  is the extension o f  the Zambian Copperbelt metallogenic province in 
A lto  Zambeze in the extreme east o f  the country. Here inferred reserves are put at 10 M t grading 1% 
Cu. Due to the extremely isolated location o f  these deposits, there are no plans for their development 
at present There are also numerous other superficially known copper deposits in Angola, especially on
the contact between the Cretaceous coastal sediments and the pre-Cambrian basement south o f 
Lobito36.
Gold
Gold occurs in numerous locations across the country generally in alluvial deposits. Up to 1965 about 
560 kg o f gold was produced in Angola from rudimentary small-scale mines, but all mining has since 
ceased. The main deposits are at Maiombe (Luali River, Cabinda), Lombige (Lom bige River, Cuanza 
- Norte), Gaudovira (Cunene River, Huila and Huambo), Chipindo (Cuengue River, Huila) and 
Cassinga (Colui River, Cunene)37. The most favourable prospects are Chipindo'(M ’popo mine) and 
Lombige, both o f  which were exploited in the past. In addition to the alluvial recent and fossil placers, 
the gold also occurs in small but numerous quartz veins associated to “ greenstones” . Reserves at 
M ’popo are estimated at 5 tonnes o f  gold grading 6-10 g/t38.
Carbonatites
Angola has at least 14 carbdhatite complexes. The two most important are Coola and SerraJa Neve- 
Tchivira. These offer prospects for the future mining o f nepheline, fluorite, niobium-tantalum, apatite 
and rare earths, but no work is being done on them at present. Fluorite reserves at Coola are estimated 
at 5 M t grading 71% F2Ca and at Tchivira 6 M t at 27-61% F2Ca. .
Exploration
Angola has a presently unknown mineral potential as only 20% o f the country has been geologically 
mapped at even 1:250,000 scale, let alone detailed surveys. There are undetermined reserves o f 
chromite, platinum and nickel in the extreme south-west o f the country, various alluvial gold deposits, 
several tungsten deposits in the centre o f  the country and numerous other mineral occurrences that lack 
systematic appraisal. The first step in the development o f  the Angolan mineral potential is to 
systematically survey the country. To  this end the IN A G E O  has made some progress in training 
personnel both locally and overseas. The major obstacle to the expansion o f exploration activity is still 
the low  capacity o f the Geological Survey Department (IN A G E O ) and the security situation. It is hoped 
that the former will be overcome by joint mineral exploration ventures with private capital.
Discussion
Until Salazar’s “ open-door”  policy to Western investment in the sixties, the mineral sector o f Angola • 
consisted o f  a few, generally artisanal, mines except for diamond production in the north-east which had 
started on a large scale in the twenties. The huge mineral resources had hardly been touched by the 
Portugueseandthecountrywasgeologicallyunknown. This was principally due to Portugal being a neo­
colony itselfj particularly o f  Britain. It lacked the human resources and capital to develop its own 
resources, let alone the enormous resources o f  its “ empire” .
In a vain attempt to stem the rising tide o f nationalism and the resulting guerilla wars in its colonies, 
Portugal opened up its “ empire”  to international capital. In the minerals sector this resulted in the rapid 
development in the sixties o f Angola’s oil and iron ore resources. From 1960 to 1974 diamonds, oil and 
iron ore increased from 93.6% o f the total value o f mineral production to 99.4% and, over the same 
period, mineral exports increased from 19.4% to 60.8% o f the total value o f exports and the total 
(current) value o f minerals extracted increased from 0.65 M K z to 18.5 M Kz.
The new investment policy also led to a flurry o f prospecting activity, particularly from the South 
African-based mining colossus, Anglo American-De Beers through their subsidiaries such as Condi- 
ama39 and JCI (Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Company), but, unfortunately, this did not lead
to a concomitant expansion in systematic geological survey on the part o f  the colonial state. By 1974 only 
20% o f the country had been mapped at the large scale o f 1:250,000. A t the end o f  1974 there were 20 
companies with a total o f 95 exclusive prospecting concessions including Diamang, Companhia Mineira 
doLobito, Cabgoc, Petrangol, Empresa do Cobre de Angola and Condiama. A t the end o f the same year 
there were 1,631 claims on 226 mineral deposits40.
W ith the invasions o f  1975/6 and South Africa’s undeclared war o f destabilisation until 1989, almost all 
the small-scale artisanal workings stopped, resulting in a situation at present where there are only two 
major minerals produced, o il and diamonds.
Backward and forward linkages between the minerals sector and the rest o f the economy have been, and 
continue to be, almost non-existent. In terms o f  forward linkages, virtually all mineral production is 
exported, or vertically integrated into the developed market economies. About 10% o f o il production 
is refined locally before export and all diamond production is exported, legally or illicitly. The only sector 
with high linkages is the tiny mineral building materials sector comprising, sand, clay, limestone, 
gypsum, stone and marble. In terms o f backward linkages, there have never-been industries, other than 
fuel, supplying mining inputs. A ll machinery, explosives, chemicals, plant, etc... have had to be imported.
Planned projects for further processing such as the urea and P V C  plant based on natural gas (Soyo), the 
phosphate fertilizer plant (Kindonacaxa), the expansions o f  the refinery (Luanda) and the cement plant 
(Luanda), and the proposed D R I sponge iron and E A F  steel plant, will retain some value in the country 
as well as making available limited amounts as inputs to local industry and agriculture, but the large 
majority o f production, particularly oil, will still have to be exported due to the limited size o f  the 
domestic market. Investment by Sonangol into enterprises constructing equipment for the o il industry 
(Petromar) has managed keep some o f the value inside the country though these companies are 
themselves highly dependent on imported inputs.
The essential prerequisite to the development o f the economy and with it the country’s mineral 
resources is the ending, or at least diminishing o f the war. This would not only open up for exploration 
and exploitation minerals in presently dangerous zones, but would also release enormous financial and 
human resources from the war e ffort Defence is the largest recipient o f the national budget, o f scarce 
foreign exchange and o f  human resources. The key aspect to the ending o f the war is the ending o f US 
aid to U N IT A  and the closing o f  their bases in Zaire. U N IT A  has been able to receive open assistance 
from the USA, since the repeal o f the Clarke Amendment (which banned aid to U N IT A  in 1976) in 1985, 
and is reported to be receiving 50 to 100 M U SD  per annum.
In terms o f the SADCC, Angola has the largest mineral complementarity in the region as all the other 
states import oil and/or oil products. SAD CC oil consumption is about 4 ktoe/an, less than 20% o f 
Angolan production. The main obstacle to Angola supplying the SAD CC is that there is no operating 
rail or existing pipeline link to the rest o f the region meaning that the oil and oil products would have 
to be shipped around the Cape to Beira and Dar es Salaam, giving it no cost advantage over o il from the 
Gulf. In addition the SAD C C  refineries (Zambia and Tanzania) were not designed to take Angolan 
crude. However, i f  the region was economically integrated it might make sense to build a pipeline to the 
Zambian refinery in Ndola (Indeni) then distribute the products to the region’s consumers by rail and 
road.
The other areas where Angolan minerals might cater for regional demand are fertilisers (nitrogen and 
phosphate) and steel. However, for both there are also projects in Tanzania (Kilamco and Liganga) and
Mozambique (Pande and Honde) which may be more feasible. Angola could benefit from regional 
expertise in small to medium scale mining, particularly from Zimbabwe, and mining inputs (machinery, 
explosives, chemicals) could be imported from Zambia and Zimbabwe, but this would require the 
rehabilitation o f  the Benguela line (Lobito Corridor).
In conclusion, Angola is exceptionally rich in known mineral resources, even though the bulk o f the 
country remains unexplored, but the only minerals developed have been o il and diamonds. The country 
has become increasingly mineral dependent due to the collapse o f other sectors o f  the economy (in turn 
due to thirty years o f war), particularly the coffee industry. In addition to the war, the other aspect 
limiting development is the acute shortage o f managerial and professional personnel, due to a total 
neglect o f  indigenous training during Portuguese colonialism.
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